ARAB-AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION OF ILLINOIS, INC.

REPORT
OF
AD HOC COMMITTEE
ON
THE CIVIL DISTURBANCE OF JUNE 14-15, 1992

Ad Hoc Committee:

William J. Haddad, Attorney at Law
President, Arab-American Bar Association

Rouhy Shalabi, Attorney at Law
Vice President, Arab-American Bar Association

Dr. Rodolphe de Seife, Professor of Law,
Northern Illinois University School of Law

Joseph Haddad, Attorney at Law

George Rashid, Attorney at Law
Board of Directors

Fadi Zanayed, Attorney at Law
Board of Directors

ARAB-AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION OF ILLINOIS, INC.
Post Office Box 81325
Chicago, Illinois 60681
(312) 946-0110

I.
Introduction

     On June 14, 1992 the Chicago Bulls basketball team won its second world championship in the National Basketball Association. After the completion of the telecast depicting their victory, civil disturbances erupted on Chicago's north side nightclub district which received widespread media attention. Contemporaneous to this, there was a wide scale civil disturbance on the west and south sides of Chicago, both of which are economically depressed regions. Many retail establishments were looted, vandalized, and burned during this disturbance. Since most, but not all, of the victims were Arab Americans, the Board of Directors of the Arab American Bar Association of Illinois was asked to look into the matter.

     On June 23, 1992 the Board of Directors met and formed a Committee to study the situation and issue its evaluation of the legal and practical dynamics of this disturbance, as they exist, between the victimized merchants and the law enforcement establishment. The Ad Hoc Committee of attorneys from the Arab American Bar Association ("AABAR") was comprised of the following persons: William J. Haddad (Chairman), President of AABAR and a former Cook County (Chicago) prosecutor; Rouhy Shalabi, Vice President of AABAR and Chairman of the Arab-American Advisory Council to the Human Relations Commission of Chicago; Dr. Rodolphe de Seife, Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University; Joseph Haddad, a former Chicago Policeman; Fadi Zanayed, former President of the Arab-American Anti-Defamation Committee; and George Rashid, a member of AABAR's Board of Directors.

     The Ad Hoc Committee received the cooperation of the Arab-Advisory Council to the Chicago Human Relations Commission, officials of the Chicago Police Department, individual merchants, community organizations, lawyers and researchers at Northern Illinois Law School. The Ad Hoc Committee compiled information and research that included eyewitness accounts from looting victims, accumulated statistical data on property losses, police guidelines, legal standards adopted by the American Bar Association, statutes, and ordinances governing police powers and duties.

II.
The Extent of the Civil Disturbance

     A reading and interpretation of the data supplied by the Chicago Human Relations Commission indicates that the civil disturbance on the night of June 14 and the early morning hours of June 15, 1992, resulted in $14,105,674 in property damage, $8,165,753 of which (58%) pertained to Arab-American merchants. In all 387 merchants were victimized, 35% Arab-Americans, 20% African-Americans, and 17% Asian-Americans.

     Because of the large presence of Arab-American merchants in the areas of the south and west sides of Chicago, the disturbances had a particularly strong impact upon their business community. Reports from the Chicago Police Department and the Chicago Human Relations Commission indicate that 139 Arab owned businesses reported losses due to crimes outlawed under Illinois Revised Statutes, Chapter 38, the Illinois Criminal Code; i.e. looting (par. 42-1), arson/aggravated arson (par. 20-1), burglary (par. 19-1), theft (par. 16-1), and vandalism/criminal damage to property (par. 21-1). The average property loss to an effected business was $59,746. 12% of these merchants were not insured for such losses. All of these businesses were located in inner city neighborhoods, 53.5% on the south side of Chicago and 46.5% on the west side of Chicago.

     The police maintained that they were in a state of preparedness and fully mobilized during the entire weekend preceding this event. However, the unprecedented suddenness and volume of the disturbances of June 14, 1992 had far surpassed any previous such experience and, indeed, was beyond their resources and manpower. Nevertheless, the police claim that a maximum number of arrests were made and that, where individual arrests were avoided, it was because (a) police backup was unavailable, (b) prisoner transport was unavailable, or 8 the arrest amid a crowd of onlookers may have elevated the civil disturbances from mere property losses to a serious loss of life. Rather, the police opted to devote their manpower to continuing highly visible patrol in the hope of deterring more crime. Arrests were sometimes limited to circumstances where the crime was severe (forcible felonies) or in order to protect firefighters engaged with arson fires. The police contend that their restraint was not only dictated by circumstances, but in fact caused the disturbances to subside by 4:00 a.m. on June 15, 1992, with no loss of life and before the situation would have justified a request for State law enforcement personnel.

     On the other hand, the effectiveness of the Chicago Police Department was questioned in many quarters of the Arab-American community. Some merchants claimed: (1) that they encountered great difficulty in reaching police through emergency 911 service; (2) that regardless of the emergency reports of looting, for example, the police either failed to respond or did not respond for, in some instances, several hours; and (3) that in some isolated instances
there were complaints that police officers refused to stop "crimes in progress", that is, looting being done in their presence.

     Chronicled below are a few examples supplied by some merchants to AABAR concerning their complaints in obtaining police services on June 14-15, 1992.

A west side grocer reported $65,000 in business losses from looting. He claimed that the police were contacted on ten occasions from 9:45 p.m. to 12:30 a.m. Police squads drove past his store while looting was in progress but took no action. At 3:00 a.m. the police directly responded to his call, only to recommend that the owner telephone the district later to file a formal report.

A southeast side merchant reported destruction of fixtures and looting to the police at 10:30 p.m. A police car responded in 30 minutes, but the officers took no action even though the looting was in progress. Instead, the police departed.

A near west side grocer, who reports that his store was a "total loss", stated that he contacted the police on June 14, 1992 personally at the local district station. He claims that "[the police] did not do anything, they did not respond at all, they did not send anybody to the store, they do not want to write a report at that time, they told me go and protect your store" (sic). A report was not taken until June 17, 1992.

A far west side grocer reported a $35,000 loss. He claims that he contacted the police at 10:30 p.m., but that when "the police showed up..., they didn't make any attempt to stop the looting."

Another west side grocer described his losses to be $200,000. "They (police) did not respond. Didn't stop anything. They just did not do their job whatsoever... [T]hey knew what was going to happen from last year's event [i.e., last year's Bull's victory game] and they weren't prepared"

III.
Law Enforcement's Response to the Civil Disturbance

     On September 2, 1992 AABAR's Ad Hoc Committee, in conjunction with the Arab American Advisory Counsel, met with officials of the Chicago Police Department, particularly those who were in charge of patrol and communications on the night of the disturbance: George Ruckrich, Chief of Patrol Division; Ronald Garcia, Deputy Chief of Area 4; John Cadogan, Chief, Organized Crime Division, previously Administrative Assistant to Chief of Patrol; and Thomas Sadler, Commanding Officer, Communications Section. In this meeting these officials outlined the plan designed by the police prior to the disturbance.

     A Chicago Police plan was developed in the weeks prior to the weekend of June 13 through 15, 1992. The plan was based upon information from prior incidents that followed major sporting events, as well as current intelligence information gathered through inquiries to District Commanders.

     The plan called for a maximum effort of personnel and equipment. Logistically, the plan for that weekend included the raising of a maximum complement of 1,473 police officers and deploying 1,132 police officers from other units for a total of 2,605 police officers. Days off for 15 operational units were canceled and elective time off was granted only on an emergency basis. Days off for police district commanders were canceled. Each commander reported for duty at 6:00 p.m. on Saturday and remained on duty until the incident was brought under control. In addition, commanders of support units and their staffs were also put on duty to ensure a prompt response to any requests for equipment/vehicles/supplies, etc.

     Should a disturbance occur, the plan required that all tours of duty would be automatically extended in order to double the manpower which is what occurred at 11:00 p.m. to 12:00 a.m. on June 14, 1992. As backup, the State Police held 800 officers in reserve for relief of city police officers as needed. The National Guard stood ready with 2000 soldiers capable of responding within 8 hours if called by the Governor. The Detective Division was converted from their normal investigative routine to stand ready to process all arrestees.

     Mobilization was another logistical need requiring maximum effort. All available vehicles were requisitioned from all divisions (including the police training center) and made operable by the Motor Maintenance Division on a priority basis. Maximum usage of vehicles accomplished several important goals: (a) visibility (and deterrence), (b) transport of police officers to focused services, and (c.) maximum transport of arrestees.

     As part of the plan, the Police Department was prepared to request through the Cook County State's Attorney that the Circuit Court of Cook County limit the issuance of individual recognizance bonds during the period of civil disturbance. The Department of Corrections was asked to (and did reserve) jail space for arrestees in their already overcrowded jails.

     Separate precautions were taken to maximize communications. Select field commanders were issued mobile telephones for communication with the central command post at Chicago Police Headquarters which oversaw the entire operation. The Police Communications Division utilized alternative dispatching strategies to facilitate the processing of extraneous radio traffic. The Communications Division's normal "peak time" complement of 34 "answering positions" was maximized to 56 such positions. No "positions" were left open and additional personnel augmented and backed up those on duty.

     Yet despite all of this, the Chicago Police Department was largely unable to protect the property of merchants located in the south and west sides of Chicago from 9:15 p.m. on June 14, 1992 until around 4:00 a.m. on June 15, 1992. The reason for this was the unprecedented magnitude of the disturbance and the sudden way it erupted. For example, Chicago Police Communications reported that at 9:15 p.m. their "entire communications board lit up within 60
seconds". Where a peak evening might involve 5000 to 6000 calls, that night was to have 14,755 calls with over 6300 in the first two hours alone. This was the highest number of 911 communication calls in the history of the Chicago Police Department.

     Nearly all calls were "crimes in progress" and, therefore, prioritization was necessarily left to the patrol officers in the streets who were receiving, at times, five dispatches at a time. Of the 14,755 phone calls made to Communications, about 1230 were never dispatched.

     At 9:15 p.m. patrolmen in the streets saw evidence of the reasons for mammoth emergency telephone reports. Police officers reported that they were literally overrun by masses of persons streaming from buildings onto the streets who thereupon commenced to indiscriminately loot and burn neighborhood businesses. Regardless of their high visibility (all police personnel were uniformed and all vehicles were marked), the police's presence did not deter the populace at that time. Indeed, 98 police officers received medical attention and over 60 police vehicles were damaged, some from bullet holes. It was not uncommon for some police officers to fight their way out of groups of civilians that converged upon them while under weapons fire.

     The Chicago Police Patrol Division reported, as predicted, that the disturbance was concentrated in west side police district 11 and south side police district 7 and to a lesser degree in districts 2, 3, 6, and 18.

     Notwithstanding these events, the Chicago Police reported that within six hours they regained control of the streets, obviating the need to contact the State Police or National Guard.

     1160 persons were arrested and jailed. There was no loss of life.

IV.
Overview of Government's Legal Duty to Act

     The American Bar Association's Standards for the Administration of Criminal Justice outlines certain rights and duties concerning the police. Clearly, the duty to enforce laws and protect property are inherent constitutional and statutory requirements of a law enforcement agency. What the police actually do in a given situation is determined by several factors. (1) Is there a legislative mandate to act? (2) Do the police have the authority and means to enforce the
Law? (3) Are the police sensitive to community needs? That is, do they demonstrate their duty to "create and maintain a feeling of security in the community" and, further "to promote and preserve civil order"? ABA Standards, 2.1

     The legislative mandate of the City of Chicago is clearly defined in its Municipal Code, 2-84-220 (General Duties of the Police), which requires that the Chicago Police "preserve order, peace, and quiet and enforce the laws and ordinances throughout the city". Section 2-84-280 of the Code provides that a policeman who "shall refuse or neglect to perform any duty [so as to] tend to hinder, obstruct or impair in any way the proper and strict enforcement of any law... is hereby declared to be no longer qualified to be a member of the police force, and shall be discharged...."

     The State's legislative mandate to preserve life and property is found in Illinois Revised Statutes, Chapter 38, paragraphs 7-1 et seq (use of force), paragraph 33-1 ("mandatory duty"), and paragraphs 107-1 et seq (power of arrest). Under Chapter 125, Section 82, the legislature specifically directs peace officers to "suppress all riots and unlawful assembling and to keep the peace..." Under Chapter 129, paragraph 220.83 the Governor is empowered to use military force when necessary to the degree that the governor "may deem to aide civil authorities in suppressing riots and unlawful assemblies. (See also paragraphs 265 and 266)

     The ABA Standards provide that law enforcement should "take appropriate action to prevent disorder... and to deal properly and effectively with disorder when it occurs". ABA Standards, 3.3 (iv). Police are granted wide discretion, particularly in areas of selective enforcement, investigative techniques, and enforcement methods. ABA Standards, 4.3

     Despite the authority to act, can law enforcement act quickly, decisively, and effectively [and should they]? The Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, New York Times Ed., 1968 (pages 325-334), maintains that success is often based upon the sufficiency of the manpower to control a crowd and the speed with which the manpower can arrive to the scene of the civil disturbance. There must be a preconstructed strategy for this. See also, Violence in the City -- An end or a beginning? A report by the Governors Commission on the Los Angeles Riots in 1965.

V.
Findings

1. That we conclude that a widespread civil disturbance erupted in Chicago following a sporting event on June 14, 1992, causing over 14 million dollars in property losses, 58% of which effected Arab-American merchants.

2. That, according to data provided by the Commission on Human Relations, these crimes were indiscriminately focused upon any and all merchants and businesses readily at hand.

3. That, prior to the June 14th weekend, the Chicago Police Department had prepared a contingency plan that was reasonably calculated to prevent loss of life and property in that it was based upon police intelligence from district commanders and other sources, including experiences with previous disturbances following major sporting events.

4. That, unlike previous disturbances after sporting events, this one was unprecedented in its suddenness and size.

5. That the Chicago Police Department contingency plan was duly executed during the disturbance.

6. That the Chicago Police Department contingency plan was not adequate to substantially deter or to abate the civil insurrection that erupted on June 14, 1992 which caused over 14 million dollars in property losses because the Department, acting alone, could not provide timely and sufficient manpower to control the disturbances.

7. That the Chicago Police Department had a duty to use all reasonable and necessary force within its means to stop this disturbance.

8. That the Chicago Police Department did use "all" force within its means to quell the disturbance; however, due to the magnitude and suddenness of the disturbance, certain crimes against property continued to occur for nearly six hours, notwithstanding the fact that substantial arrests were made and there was no loss of life.